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Introduction
Periodic shortages of rail equipment have freqnetly imposed marketing
problems and costs upon the grain industry.

For exumple, one study

estimated the total cost due to the lack of transportation equipment
was $2.36 million dollars for Iowa elevators in 1969. 1

In spite of efforts

to resolve the equipment problem through the private sector, these costs
have persisted and led to attempts to seek relief through government
intervention.
During the 1980 legislative session, the South Dakota Governor suggested
a new approach; the purchase of rail cars by the State to supplement railroad and elevator fleets.
purchase of rail cars.

South Dakota is not alone in examining the

The Highway and Transportation Department in

ilichigan has made a similar proposal.

North Dakota recently concluded

a feasibility study which explored the same alternative.

And during

October, 1979, the Province of Saskatchewan ordered 1000 covered hopper
rail cars.
The purchase of rail cars by a State to relieve equipment shortaqes
is a new approach.

But when past attempts to resolve a problem have rc1iled,

public officials may be forced to venture into uncharted waters.

This

report is an attempt to assist decision makers in evaluating the probable
success of this policy alternative.
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First, the history and causes of rail car shortayes will be addressed
followed by an evaluation of the profitability of rail car ownership.
Thirdly, the problems of managing a public rail car fleet will be explored.
The fourth section includes a discussion of the long-term impacts that
State provision of rail cars would have upon the supply of equipment
available to move grain.

This will be achieved by analyzing the economic

incentives which motivate railroad and shipper investment in rolling
stock.

The long-term involves a period long enough for the railrouds

and shippers to make major changes in investment and disinvestment policies.
This paper concludes with an explanation of some alternatives available
to public officials that could effectively relieve the shortage by
modifying supply and demand for rail cars.

An appendix is included which

briefly applies public good theory to the provision of rail cars.

of the Rail Car
i'1hile the "investigation of the reasons for seasonal rail car
shortages" is often included in current lists of critical transportation
issues to be addressed, the problem is not of recent origin.

The very

first case heard before the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)

"involved

a complaint by the North Dakota Board of Railroad Corr:rnissioners against
th~ Northern Pacific Railway for failing to provide adequate car service
to North Dakota shippers. 11 2

Again, "as early as 1907 the Commission held

extensive hearings on freight car shortages, receiving testimony from
shippers of grain, coal, and lumber on their inability to obtain freight
cars in sufficient numbers at the time requested."3

In the fall of 1921,

the Joint Corrunission of Agricultural Inquiry, created by a Senate Resolution,
found that "the supply of box cars, coal cars, stock cars, and refrigerator
cars is inadequate to meet the demand during normal periods of activity
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and should be rapidly augmented."
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In 1953, \villiam Hudson found that

a tight boxcar situation with periodic shortages, particularly of the
better class of equipment required for grain and grain products, will probably
c:

continue over the next several years.":)

In spite of this attention, the

carrier car shortage problem continues and elevators have started acquiring
private fleets in order to reach rail based markets.
No single factor can be identified as the primary contributor to this
continuing shortage of railcars.

Rather, it has resulted from the interaction

of numerous economic and non-economic incentives over time.

Following are

nine factors which have and continue to contribute to the shortage:
First, the railroads have failed to share in general periods of
economic prosperity.

They have earned an average of about 2~ percent return

on investment between 1964 and 1979, and during the last 5 years the return
has averaged 1.6 percent. 6

Railroad earnings are not sufficient to meet

all their capital requirement.

The low rate of return discourages reinvesting

railroad earnings back into the railroad and also fails to attract outside
capital.
A second factor contributing to the rail car shortage is the seasonal
production pattern of grain combined with year-to-year variation in foreign
demand.

This creates shortages and surpluses of rail equipment over time.

The result is that "carriers may invest in capacity that is under-utilized
during off-peak periods or use existing capacity so intensively that costs
increase in greater proportion than output. 117

These changes in demand

over time can be compounded by agricultural production practices.

For

example, the technological development and adaptation of the picker sheller
and corn dryer increased, from 29 to 59 percent, the amount of corn moving
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directly to the Iowa elevator duri~0 harvest. 8

Increases in farm

storage capacity also provided farmers with the ability to alter historicc1l
marketing patterns.

This creates surges in grain movements in response

to changes in grain demand rather than the predictable pattern of grain
production.
A third factor contributing to the equipment shortage is the decrease
in car utilization over time.9

Railroads and shippers are constantly

striving to reduce labor requirements while providing greater protection
for cargo.
door boxcar.

The result has been the demise of the plain, 40 foot, narrow
It has been replaced by cars specifically designed and

equipped to meet the requirements of individual commodities.

However,

this has resulted in an inflexible car fleet which cannot serve multiple
uses as transportation demands change.

Therefore the percent of loaded

miles has decreased from 67 percent of total miles in 1946 to 57.9 percent
in 1979.
Fourth, rail rates remain stable throughout the year, failing to
reflect the seasonality of grain production or to allocate demand over
time.

While the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976

(RRRR Act) addressed this issue by instructing the Interstate Commerce
Commission "to provide sufficient incentive to shippers to reduce peakperiod shipments, 1110 seasonal rates were not widely adopted and the
provision was repealed in 1980.
Fifth, the "Economics of Forced Compensation" is the title Tosterud
and Nelson 11 have applied to the neqative incentive provided by existing
per diem rates.

Per diem rates are the fees paid by one railroad to

another for using rail cars and are established by the American Association
of Railroad (AAR) and the ICC.

Historically they have been maintained at
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a level which is below cost to the railroad owning the car.

The low

level of per diem fees continues primarily through the efforts of
those railroads whose total car usage is greater than their ownership.
These carriers are located within territories which terminate more
interregional carloads than are originated.
been the eastern roads.

Historically, these have

The western roads, including those serving

South Dakota, are forced to interline carloads of traffic with eastern
carriers, and rather than invest in cars to meet their needs, the deficit
carriers simply keep the cars and use them as long as they are needed.
During periods of car surpluses, cars are returned to the owning carrier
empty, while westbound loads are loaded in the cars owned by the deficit
carriers.

In addition to an increase in empty miles, which use additional

resources, this practice also places a disproportionate share of the
cost of the car surplus upon railroads having an adequate car supply.
Grun field su:mn1arized the impact of the per diem incentive, 1 2
(a) a per diem rate which was less than prospective daily
ownership costs of a new freight car would lead to an overall
deficiency in freight car ownership; (b) a single per diem rate
would discourage the purchase of the more expensive freight cars
with their greater annual depreciation expensel3; and (c) a
seasonally inflexible per diem rate would fail to equate freight
car demand with opportunity costs during peak and off-peak periods.
The sixth factor is that the existing demurrage charges make rail cars
economical storage alternatives during periods of storage stress.

Demurrage

is the fee shippers and receivers pay for holding a rail car beyond the
normal time necessary for loading or unloading.

~lhile the d;::iily demurrage

rate increases with time, elevators which are filled becc1use of heavy grain
movement still find rail cars an economical storage alternative.

Unfortunately,

this inefficient use of grain cars normally occurs during harvest periods
when car shortages often are greatest.

G

Another factor is that the ICC is charged with the responsibility of
protecting the public interest and must decide between the interests of
large and small shippers.

Large elevators, capable of shipping unit

trains, use rail cars much more efficently than smaller elevators.

According

to an Iowa study, the movement of grain in unit trains requires only 28
percent of the number of cars that would be needed to transport the
grain in single car movements. 14
between efficiency and equity.

Thus the ICC is charged with choosing
A recent policy limited the percentage

of cars used in unit trains, protecting the interests of the smaller and
branchline elevators while reducing the total amount of grain which is
moved.

In August 1980 the responsibility for car service was shifted to

the A.AR.

Renewed emphasis on efficiency will likely lead to policies

improving car utilization to the detriment of smaller shippers.
An eighth factor is the limited capacity of American rail car
builders.

Over the past decade, purchasers have faced order backlogs

which have delayed delivery of grain cars for many months.

This backlog

limits the ability of railroads or elevators to respond quickly to
changes in demand and it also means public purchases will delay private
purchases.

The Economics of Public Car Ownership
The ninth and most important factor contributing to the r;;iil cur
shortage is the fact that owning or leasing railcars is unprofitable for
either elevators or railroads.
want to own their own.

Both need cars to operate, but neither

Rather, they prefer that someone else own the

required equipment and allow them to use it.

If owning rail cars were

profitable, railroads would be buying cars, rather than reducing
investment as they have in the past.

During the last ten years, for
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example, class one railroads reduced their car capacity ownership by
over 20,000 cars per year.15

The argument can also be extended to shippers

who would gladly purchase cars if they were a good investment, but
shippers have also been reluctant investors.

\Jhile shipper-owned or

leased cars increased by over 6,400 units per year between 1969 and 1979 16
they were not purchased as an investment but rather as a necessary cost
of doing business.

Rail markets often pay more than truck markets and

elevators need rail cars to receive the higher bid.

Since railroads do

not provide enough rail cars the elevators have had to acquire their own.
They lose money on their private fleets but the higher price received for
the grain offsets the loss and their total income is increased.
The specific profitability of owning rail cars is developed in Table
1.

The major variables are turnaround time, car cost, and mileage credits.

Turnaround is the number of trips a car makes each month and is usually
higher if the car is in a unit train.
through a lease or purchase price.

Car costs can be estimated either

Since both methods are used extensively

by shippers and an active lease market exists, theory suggests that either
lease prices or purchase prices would provide adequate estimates for car
costs.

Mileage credits are the fees paid by railroads to shippers when

shippers use their own car.
mile for covered hopper cars.

The early 1980 rate was 24 cents per loaded
Table 1 reveals that car lease payments

exceed mileage earnings for all reasonable assumptions.

Historically,

rail car investments have not been profitable for carriers or shippers.
All figures in Table 1 represent actual turnaround experienced by private
shippers.
It must be stressed that State-owned or leased cars would also incur
a deficit.

Thus, not only would the State incur the initial cost but the

rail fleet would require continuing operating support.
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These nine factors have inter~cted with others not identified to
create an environment which has discoraged the railroads and elevators
from purchasing grain cars.

In fact, between 1960 and 1979 the railroads

have actually reduced their ownership of cars capable of carrying grain. 17

Table 1.

Cost of Monthly Rail Car Ownership

Assume:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Cost of
Lease per
Month

A 15 year lease signed during the first quarter of
1980. A likely lease rate would include a monthly
payment $570 and an annual charge of $0.02 for each
mile over 30,000. This rate is subject to increases
as Daintenance costs increase.
Railroads pay $0.24 per loaded Dile for privately leased
or owned covered hoppers during early 1980.
These figures represent 100 percent utilization, 12
months per year. Costs increase rapidly if the cars
are idle.

Number of Loads
Per Month

Monthly
Mileage Credit
Earned

Profit or (Loss}
Per Car
Per Month

300 Mi
$570
570
570

$ 72
144
216

l

2*
3

$(498)
( 426)
(354)

700 Mile One l·Jay Trip
570
576
604

l*
2**
3

168
336
504

(402)
(240)
(100)

1500 i-1ile One \·lay Trip
580
640
640

l

1. 66***
2****

360
600
525*****

( 220)
( 40)
(115)

*Probable turnaround for single car movement - Current turnaround for
Burlington Northern (BN)
**Probable turnaround for unit train
***Turnaround achieved by unit train shippers in Nebraska using Burlington
Northern
****Turnaround achieved by unit train shippers in Nebraska using Union Pacific
*****The Union Pacific has a lower rate rather than a mileage credit which
works out to about $0.175 per loaded Dile
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The volume of grain carried depend

upon factors other th.cm capacity,

such as turnaround and the nwnber of cars in serviceable condition.
Therefore, the total car capacity may be increasing but failing to match
increases in grain production.

Turnaround and Public Ownership of Rail Cars
A major factor contributing to grain car availability is the efficiency
with which rail cars are used; i.e., turnaround.

If the State owned cars

do not match railroad and elevator turnaround, public provision of rail
cars will decrease the total grain carrying capacity.

Following are some

problems which will affect turnaround of State controlled cars.
Efficienty and Equity
Throughout their history, railroads have been charged with discrimination against some shippers in the allocation of cars.

Through the purchase

of rail equipment the State could attempt to alleviate this.

The State

will find, however, as the railroads have, that efficiency and equity are
often mutually exclusive goals.

The elevators which are experiencing the

greatest shortage are also the most expensive to serve, i.e., the small
or branchline elevators.

Through serving these elevators, the State will

reduce turnaround and increase the net cost per bushel.

Thus the State

wou.ld have to choose between efficiency and equity, between movinq the
greater volilllle of grain for each dollar invested and serving all the
elevators in South Dakota.

And this would be an extremely difficult

decision for any public employee.
Assignment Problems
The State could assign cars permanently to individual shippers, but
this would result in a fleet which would be inflexible and unresponsive
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to changes in demand.

And further, a permanent assignment is difficult to

justify based upon shipper needs.

If a shipper would benefit enough to

merit a permanently assigned State car, he should invest in a private fleet.
The State could also assign the cars to the railroad's fleet, but this
would mean the carriers would allocate the cars.

And if the cars ever

returned to South Dakota, the same allocation problems created by the
railroads in the past would continue.

Empty cars could also be assigned

after each trip but this requires extra handling by the railroads and
takes extra time, which increases costs.
Management
The elevators which have used their fleets the most efficiently have
hired full time traffic managers.
the State.

This would also be a requirement for

A fleet of 1,000 cars would take a minimum staff of three

people and a high speed computer compatible with the railroads' computers.
Periods of Surplus Equipment
The seasonality of grain marketing creates fluctuations in the
derived demand for transportation services.

Some firms have achieved a

higher level of utilization by co-leasing with shippers with different
seasonal demand patterns.

For example, grain dealers and fertilizer dealers

occasionally co-lease equipment, and each shipper uses the cars during their
period of greatest need.

Occasionally, a shipper will find the seasonal

patterns have fluctuated, creating the need for the cars when they are
assigned to the co-lessee.

A private business recognizes that to maximize

long term profits, an occasional short-term loss may be incurred.

But

considering the political problems that could result if State owned rail
cars were moving fertilizer during a grain car shortage; it is unlikely
any public official could advocate a co-lease.
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Under existing tariff regulations 18 railroads need not accept private
(State owned) cars during periods of car surpluses.

And the significant

variation in the volume of grain marketed within and between crop years can
turn car shortages into surpluses.

For example, weekly shortages of

8,000 covered hoppers during October 1976 evaporated into surpluses of
nearly 5,000 cars per week by the end of 1976.

Surpluses also existed

during most of May through September 1977 (see Table 2).

During time of

surplus equipment, the State would encounter the same dilenuna as the
other non-rail owners.

That is, how do they capitalize on an investment

which is continuing to incur costs but which cannot be used?

In addition,

cars not in use incur a storage charge if they are stored on a railroadowned siding, and many elevators in South Dakota do not ovm their sidings.
The problem of surplus equipment could be resolved in the short run by
requiring that publicly owned rail cars be utilized before carrier or
shipper-supplied equipment.

This would minimize the net public cost,

but as the railroads and elevators became the residual car supplier,
utilization of their equipment would decrease, making ownership more
expensive and encouraging an even faster disinvestment for railroads
and the reduction of shipper investment.

Therefore, this would be

counter-productive to the long run objective that State provision of
rail cars was designed to achieve.
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Table 2.

Week
9/ 4/76
9/11/76
6
9/2
10/ 2/76
10/ 9/76
10/16/76
10/23/76
10/30/76
11/ 6/76
11/13/76
11/20/76
11/27/76
12/ 4/76
12/11/76
12/18/76
12/2
1/ 1/77
1/ 8/77
1/15/77
1/22/77
1/29/77
2/
2/12/77
2/19/77
2/26/77
3/ 5/77
2/77
3/19/77
3/26/77
4/ 2/77
4/ 9/77
4/16/77
4/23/77
4/30/77

asource:

Surplus and
Seventy Week Period.a

40-Foot
Narrow
Door
Box Cars
9, 311
9,220
9,185
8,242
7,346
3, 673
3,072
3,209
2,740
6,329
7,509
9,500
10,923
ll, 129
11,805
12,996
12,734
11, 695
10,700
7,980
3,714
1,433
(l,053)
(1,722)
(2,213)
(2,924
(2,479)
(1,550)
(1, 042)
(l,028)
(817)
(301)
(1,018)
1,445

Covered
Hopper
(3,621)
(2,623)
(3,980
(4,017)
(3,919)
(8,130)
(9,142)
(8,056)
(7,261)
(5,671)
(3,848)
( 1, l 04)
1,463
2,800
4,884
5,216
5,279
2,641
(835)
(3,624)
(7,291)
(9,666)
(12,140)
(11,957)
(10,050)
(11,433)
(11, 381)
(10,839)
(9,246)
(8 I 321)
(7, 396)
(6,994)
(5,921)
(4,378

of the U.S. Rail Car

Week
7/77
4/77
1/77
6/ 4/77
6/11/77
6/18/77
6/25/77
7/ 2/77
7/ 9/77
7/16/77
7/23/77
7/30/77
8/ G/77
8/13/77
8/20/77
7/77
9/ 3/77
9/10/77
9/17/77
9/24/77
10/ 1/77
10/ 8/77
10/15/77
10/22/77
10/29/77
11/ 5/77
11/12/77
11/19/77
11/26/77
12/ 3/77
12/10/77
12/17/77
12/24/77
1/77

40-I-'oot
Narrow
Door
Box Cars
3,946
5,284
5,940
7 ,8ll
8,238
8,595
8,302
7,912
6,318
5,140
3,773
3,024
2,656
2,251
3,121
3 t 129
3,706
3,542
3,030
2,202
1,246
462
175
( 269)
(8 37)
(1,157)
(1,226)
(1,255)
(1,202)
(1,851)
(1,655)
(1,512)
(1,353)
(1,273)

for a

Covered
Hopper
(996)
627
1,955
2,577
2,020
386
705
1,486
(32)
(62)
(1,415)
(1,035)
(1,050)
(543)
41
1,098
1,935
949
(897)
(2,052)
(4,111)
(,1,647)
(3,753)
(6,836)
(8,145)
(9 I 796)
(9,100)
(9,215)
(7,464)
(7,186)
(6,947)
(7,068)
(7,182)
(6,865)

North Dakota Public Service Commission, "Prelininary Report
on Feasibility of State of North Dakota Acquiring a Covered
Hopper Rail Fleet," Bismarck, North Dakota, November 1978.
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Provi:;ion

In spite of potential management difficulties or operating costs,
the critical issue in determining if the State should purchase rail cars,
is the long-run impact.

Will public provision increase the total

of rail cars available for South Dakota grain shippers, or could the
supply actually be decreased over time?

The answer is dependent upon the

expected behavior or response of existing car owners including railroads
and elevators.
If one assumes that public investment will have no impact upon
either private investment or car allocation, the additional investor
would increase the total car supply and relieve a portion of the cost
imposed by shortages.
several reasons.

Unfortunately, this is an unlikely outcome for

First, limited capac

exists for building rail cars,

and delivery usually varies from between one and two years.

Therefore,

the total number of cars which can be manufactured will not increase with
State purchase, and an investment would simply delay delivery to
private purchasers.

And secondly, it does not consider the economic

incentives for either the railroad or elevators which own or lease cars.
If, on the other hand, one assumes that the railroads and
will adopt

behavior in response to the newly created economic

institution and incentives, the effective increase in the total supply of
rail cars will be far less than the State's total

se.

In fact,

it is possible that if the State purchases rail cars, the long term
impact will be to reduce the number of cars available to move grain.
This scenario, which assumes a
to the
outcome.

response

current car o~Tiers

economic and political incentive, is moreover, the probable
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Railroads have existed in a hiqhly regulated environment for many
years and have learned to make calculated decisions based upon the
response they expect from the public sector.

In fact, railroads are

often accused of strategic manipulation in other decision making processes
such as branchline abandonment cases. 19

These allegations, however, are

simply charges that the railroads are attempting to maximize profits
within the existing institutional parameter, and there is little reason
to expect them to alter their profit-maximizing behavior when planning
car investment.

The continuing low rate of return to car ownership

provides no incentive for the railroads to purchase additional cars or
even to maintain the existing fleet.

Presently the opportunity cost of

capital dictates that railroads disinvest in rail cars and utilize the
capital for other purposes, very

non-rail investment.

A change in the rules of the game will encourage railroads to adopt
further strategic behavior.

If they believe that States will purchase

rail cars, they will adopt a strategy designed to create additional need
to justify further public investment.

This could be accomplished by:

(1) continuation of railroads' disinvestment policy of the past many
decades; and,
cars.

(2) reassigning cars to other states not purchasing rail

Past rules governing allocation would encouraye tl1is because

nearby states would initially have more unfilled car orders.
The other major source of grain cars is the elevators, which have
become unwilling investors in response to the railroad's disinvestment.
Access to rail cars is profitable for grain elevators because greater
net returns can be secured in rail-based markets.

But because of rail

disinvestment, carrier-supplied cars are not readily available, and many
elevators have responded by purchasing or leasing cars.

I!owever, mileage

15

credits do not offset lease costs, and consequently the rail cars themselves
result in a net cost.

Thus while access to rail cars is profitable for

elevators, access to someone else's car is more profitable than a private
fleet, and elevators prefer to eliminate their investment.

This situation

provides elevators with the incentive to also adopt strategic behavior
and attempt to induce someone else to purchase rail equipment, in this
situation, the State.
The ultimate strategy which would be adopted by elevators is, however
more difficult to project.

They have more to lose if rail cars are

unavailable, but they also have better access to decision-making process,
which encourages strateqic behavior.

It is likely that as long as shippers

believe that a potential public investment might be forthcoming, private
investment will be discouraged and delayed.

Shippers will also actively

encourage public investment through lobbying and news releases.

This

necessitates a prompt and forceful decision because as long as the
decision remains unresolved or private investors perceive an irresolute
decision, they will delay additional rail car purchases.
Because public investment discourages private investment, once the
State has initiated a fleet, continuing pressures will exist to expand the
public fleet as private owners disinvest.

Of course, one can argue that

the State can purchase perhaps 1,000 cars and announce that it is a onetime transaction, never to be repeated.
theory.

This is simply round two of game

In round three, most shippers probably would believe further

public pressure could force another round of State investment and then
another.

lG

The exact outcome is difficul~ to quantify without estimating supply
and demand functions.

However, there is no doubt that in the short-run,

the increase in the total supply of grain cars will be significantly less
than the nwnber of cars the State purchc1sed.

This is because of the

strategic behavior adopted by elevators and railroads in response to the
new incentives.
A Decrease in the Supply of Rail Cars
It is possible, under some conditions, that by purchasing rail cars
the State would actually decrease the supply which is available to move
grain.

Should private investors believe that additional public purchases

are possible, the long-term impact could actually be a reduction in cars
available as private interests attempt to "force" additional public
investment.

Elevators could reduce the number of cars they own or plan

to own in a greater nwnber than the State buys which would decrease the
available supply.
Secondly, the total supply of rail car capacity is a function of
the number of cars and the turnaround.

Earlier, several factors were

identified which suggested turnaround for State owned cars could be
less than for privately rnmed cars.

A decrease in turnaround ainounts

to reduced capacity available to move grain.

And thirdly, railroads

could shift cars to other states.
Should each of these probable outcomes occur, the long-term iQpact
would be a net decrease in the number of cars available to move grain
in the State making the car purchase.
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The fact that the net increas0 in cars is less than the total State
purchase of cars yields interesting economic results.

Normal accoL1nting

practices would divide the total cost of owning the rail fleet by the
bushels of grain moved to determine the State's cost per bushel.and
measure the effectiveness of the State investment.
estimate the actual additional cost per bushel.

This would under-

The net cost per bushel

of the State car purchasH :;~ould be determined by dividing the total cost
of the State fleet by the nwnber of bushels moved in excess of the grain
which would have moved without the State purchase.

If the net additional

car capacity is significantly less than the State's total acquisition,
the cost of moving the additional grain becomes rather large.

Summary:

Impact of Public Provision Upon Car Supply

The agricultural citizenry of various states are seeking the assistance
of the public sector to resolve the rail equipment shortage.

They are

proposing that State governments purchase rail cars to supplement railroad
and elevator fleets.

An analysis of the economic environment and the

institutional incentives suggest that State acquisition of rail cars
would have little positive impact upon the total supply in the long-run.
And it is very likely that the incentives generated could result in a
decrease in the total supply.

This also results in an extremely high

cost for the additional bushels of grain moved.

The reasons that State

ownership of rail cars would prove both costly and ineffective is that this
plan addresses only the symptoms and does not treat the causes.

The State

does have some viable alternatives available which would address the causes
and increase car supply, and stabilize demand.
next section.

These are identified in the
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Supply Side Modifications
Currently rental rates in the form of per diem, demurrage, and
shipping rates are administered at a level below ownership costs.

A

market transaction would increase the return to car ownership and would
thereby encourage additional investment.
A second vehicle which has proven effective in increasing the supply
of rail cars is collective action between various elevators.

In some

instances the purchase of rail cars has been included in an overall
cooperative effort such as building a subterminal.

In other cases the

only collective action effort has been to acquire and manage a cooperative
fleet of rail cars.

But in spite of its success, collective action

has not become a widely adopted strategy in South Dakota because of
information limitations and organization costs.

Thus a vehicle which would

encourage and facilitate the various cooperative, private, and line
elevators in collectively purchasing and managing a rail car fleet could
reduce the equipment shortage problem.

One alternative would be to establish

a rail car expert within the State Department of Transportation.

This

individual would have the needed information regarding all aspects of car
leases including cost and risk and could function as the vehicle through
which organizational efforts could proceed.

But this institutional

arrangement would, of course, reinforce the railroads' current disinvestment
strategy.
Demand Side Modifications
When grain prices are high, or during harvest season, car shortages
exist, while at other times, rail cars stand idle.

Thus the temporal

allocation of demand is critical to effective utilization.

Felton has
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suggested a rail car market in which potential users could bid for
railroad equipment. 2 0

In addition to encouraging additional invest~ent

on the supply side, this would allocate equipment more effectively and
partially eliminate the problems of seasonal demand variation, noncompensatory per diem and demurrage rates, allocation among shippers, and
the decrease in utilization.

Other institutions which would prove

effective in allocating demand temporally include flexible rail rates
and seasonal rates.

Should variable rates be implemented, risk will

increase for elevators because as they contract grain for future delivery
they cannot lock in a transportation rate.

Therefore, elevator margin

will widen unless a futures market in transportation service is developed
to protect elevators against transportation risk.

Wider margins would

be borne by the farmer.
However, the volume of grain requiring transportation is too volatile
to suggest that these marginal changes would be completely effective in
allocating demand over time.

While domestic demand for grain is relatively

stable over time, export demand fluctuates greatly in response to various
factors such as weather-generated shortfalls of grain in other countries,
embargoes, and other foreign policy, and policies of other nations, among
other factors.

Each time export, and thus domestic,

ces delcine,

farmers react by reducing the volume they are willing to sell and increasing
the amount they store.

As part of its food policy, the public sector

responds by making on-farm storage easier.
charges are subsidized.

But when

Both construction and carrying

ces improve, an even larger volume

of grain will require transportation, which compounds car shortages and
creates even larger transportation bottlenecks.

And again, a public
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policy designed to assist a segment of the citizenry generates behavior
which yields a suboptimal performance and perhaps even a destructive
performance.

It should be noted that on-farm storage which allocates

grain over the marketing year contributes to the orderly utilization
of rail cars.

On-farm storage which enables farmers to store production

from more than one crop year compounds the cyclical nature of grain
marketing and compounds car allocation problems.
To prevent this build-up of grain reserves at the point of production
and therefore stabilize the demand for transportation services, an
institutional modification is necessary which allows the deployment of
grain to potential markets while the farmer retains control and ownership.
Direct farmer ownership of storage facilities at ports would achieve this
objective.

Individual farmers, acting collectively, would build storage

facilities near a port with some type of transfer to the export houses.
Their grain would be shipped via the normal mode, mixed with grain of
others, to this storage facility during periods of low prices.

When an

individual was ready to sell, he would issue instructions to the facility
manger to deliver the grain to an export house.
is plagued with numerous problems, including:
difficulties,

Obviously this suggestion
(1) potential managerial

(2) liability claims for transit or storage damage,

unwillingness of local elevators to load farmer-owned grain,

(4)

(3)
lack of

physical control by farmers,

(5) the higher construction, land, and tax

costs at an urban facility.

Finally, on-farm storage costs are perceived

to be much less than they actually are, which perceptually make off-farm
storage comparatively less favorable.

While this institutional

arrangement - direct farmer ownership of storage facilities - is plagued
with problems, the potential benefits justify further exploration.

The
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public sector could play a critical role in facilitating collective action
and providing information.

Existing agricultural and food programs and

tax laws would also need to be modified before off-farm storage could
materialize.

that direct farmer ownership of storage

The exact

facilities at ports would have upon the agricultural production and
marketing sectors and the effective utilization of limited resources is
unclear and needs further analysis.

Existing agricultural policy and
facilities beyond

tax laws which encourage investment in farm

one year's crop are probably going to compound the rail car
over time.

and Conclusion
The State is correct that public intervention is necessary to modify
and demand for rail cars.

the

Rather than additional restrictions

upon the market, however, the key is a solution based upon a minimum of
administrative proceedings and a maximum of institutional incentives designed
to induce investment.

Because of the various economic incentives, State

provision of rail cars will induce strategic behavior by railroads and
Their response will be a reduced investment in rail cars,
counteracting the State funding.

The exact impact upon the total or the

marginal supply is indeterminant, but the increase in

will be

ficantly less than the total number of cars acquired by the State.
And possibly, the net
rail cars.

would be a decrease in the total supply of

State action which would encourage collective action amony

the various elevators and increase the available information would likely
have a more permanent and positive effect.

To resolve the problem, it is

necessary to modify the institutions which have created the existing situation.
Only then will an adequate fleet of cars be available to transport grain
produced in South Dakota.
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